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BALTIJAS VALSTIS PSRS SASTĀVĀ

NO POSTSTAĻINISMA LĪDZ PĀRBŪVEI

1953–1990

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СТРАНЫ БАЛТИИ В СОСТАВЕ СССР

ОТ ПОСТСТАЛИНИЗМА ДО ПЕРЕСТРОЙКИ

1953–1990

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Krājums satur starptautiskas zinātniskās konferences materiālus, kurā piedalījās Latvijas, Lietuvas, Krievijas, Francijas un ASV pētnieki. Pirmoreiz profesionālie vēsturnieki, ka arī ekonomisti, demogrāfi, citu sociālo zinātņu pārstāvji piedalījās Baltijas valstu atrašanās PSRS sastāvā periodā no 1953. līdz 1990. gadam dažādu aspektu apspriešanā.

В сборнике представлены материалы международной научной конференции с участием исследователей из Латвии, Литвы, России, Франции и США. Впервые профессиональные историки, а также экономисты, демографы, представители других социальных наук приняли участие в обсуждении различных аспектов нахождения стран Балтии в составе СССР в период с 1953 по 1990 г.

The reports presented in the issue were made by researchers from Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, France, the USA, at the international scientific conference. For the first time ever professional historians together with economists, demographers, representatives of other social sciences discussed various aspects of Baltic States as part of the USSR during the period from 1953 till 1990.

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Padomju "ģenerālgubernators": Baltijas republiku komunistisko partiju CK otrie sekretāri un etniskās nomenklatūras. 1953–1990

Sauļus Gribkauskas

Kopsavilkums

Otrā sekretāra institūcija Maskavai bija izšķiroši svarīga, lai iegūtu papildus informāciju līdztekus tai, ko piegādāja vietējā nomenklatūra. Atbilstoši tradīcijai otrais sekretārs bija nevis attiecīgās republikas pamatnācijas pārstāvis, bet krievs, parasti ar iepriekšēju ilgstošu karjeru Krievijas Federācijā vai pat PSKP Centrālkomitejā pirms iecelšanas darbā citā padomju republikā. Ieradušies attiecīgajā republikā, viņi veica svarīgāko vietējās centrālkomitejas nodaļu darbības tiešu uzraudzību. To skaitā bija partijas organizatoriskā un administratīvā darba orgāni, kas kontrolēja kadru jautājumus, tieslietu sistēmu un VDK darbību.

Lai arī šīs institūcijas pirmsākumi meklējami Staļina laiku pašā sākumā, konkrētu formu tā ieguva 50. gadu vidū, pēc īsa pēcstaļiniskā perioda laiku pārtraukuma, kad otro sekretāru amatus ieņēma vietējie funkcionāri. 50. gadu vidū uz Kaukāza un Baltijas republikām tika nosūtīti centra pārstāvji. Lai arī institūcijas atjaunošanas formālais iemesls bija problēmas lauksaimniecībā, aiz lauksaimniecības problēmām slēpās Maskavas patiesie mērķi uzturēt stingrāku kontroli pār Baltijas republikām, vismaz daļēji sakarā ar nacionālisma izpausmēm reģionā. Lauksaimnieciskais konteksts ļāva Maskavai iejaukties Baltijas nomenklatūras lietās un atjaunot otrā sekretāra politisko institūciju. Meklējot veidus, kā paplašināt savu varu un politisko ietekmi, otrie sekretāri izmantoja ne tikai tiešos varas līdzekļus, bet arī "maigo varu" – zināšanas un izpratni par politisko dzīvi Maskavā, kas bija iegūta iepriekšējā darba gados PSKP Centrālkomitejas aparātā. Kā Maskavas lēmumu galvenie izskaidrotāji padomju republikās, otrie sekretāri spēja nodrošināt sev ietekmīgas pozīcijas, augstu nomenklatūras statusu un veidoja personisku privāto kontaktu tīklu.

The Soviet "Governor General": Ethnic Nomenclatures and the Second Secretaries of Communist Parties' Central Committees in the Baltic Republics. 1953–1990

*Saulius Grybkauskas**

First of all the question is who was the second secretary? As a rule, the second secretary was a Russian, rather than a member of the dominant nationality of the republic to which he was appointed; usually he had had a long career in the Russian Federation or even in Central Committee of CPSU prior to his appointment to another Soviet republic. Having arrived in a Soviet republic, they directly supervised the work of the key departments of the local Central Committee, such as the Organizational Party Work and Administrative Organs which oversaw all staffing questions, the judicial system and the activity of the KGB. The key function of second secretaries was to supervise the work of the local nomenclatura and report back directly to the Central Committee in Moscow about current events on a regular basis. The institution of second secretary was crucial for Moscow in order to obtain alternative information to that provided by the native nomenclatura.

A question may arise concerning the place and importance of Communist Party second secretaries in Soviet republics within the political system. Even the existence of the topic of the Second Secretary as such, distinguishing this functionary from the entire nomenclatura of Soviet republics, may lead to certain doubts. Is it possible to essentially differentiate the actions of the allocated functionary and the local nomenclatura? Historiographic literature and stories told at interviews make it possible to single out the specific phenomenon of the Second Secretary in the Soviet governance. Thus N. Leonov, the former instructor of the CPSU department of organizational party work (1985–1990), who was then supervising Soviet Lithuania in the Centre, has defined it as the 'institution of second secretaries'¹. Talking at the interview about the expiry of this institution in Lithuania and the appointment in 1989 of a local Russian named V. Beriozov to this post, but not a functionary nominated by Moscow, he stressed that the existing institution of second secretaries by then was important for Moscow in gaining of a certain informational alternative to the news received from the titular nomenclatura.

Needless to say, the Kremlin's control of the Soviet republics was not limited to the second secretaries. It was abetted by the nomenclatura system of appointing functionaries to leading positions; numerous reports by other local party and state agencies, such as the minutes of party meetings, were filed regularly. Frequent inspections and visits by the centre's officials, and the activity of state security services (NKVD and later the KGB), which were subordinated, to the Lubianka in Moscow

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¹ S. Grybkauskas interview with Nikolai Leonov on 28 March 2010.

also played a major role in controlling the periphery. Nevertheless, among all these institutions and measures, the position of Second secretary was uniquely important in providing full coordination and ideological legitimacy to the system as a whole.

Through the departments subordinate to him, in particular, through the department of organizational party work, the Second Secretary kept contacts with party committees of towns and regions. Efficiency of such contacts was enhanced by the system of second persons, as then second secretaries in the provinces were non-Lithuanian functionaries. It might be stated that the Second was not alone, as he was supported by the rooted system of the so-called second persons. Deputy Chairs of institutions and second secretaries of party committees in towns and regions could be important assistants of the Second.

As could be seen from statistic documents of Lithuanian Communist Party there were more second secretaries of Russian nationality at the party committees of towns and regions, than in other posts of the authorities. As for example, according to the data of 1 February 1968, among five second secretaries of the city party committees there were three Lithuanians, one Russian and one Belarusian. Though there were more Lithuanians, the aspect of second persons is obvious in comparison with the first secretaries – all five of them were Lithuanians². The dominating position in the 'second posts' is even more obvious in the lower party structures. Here, among seven second secretaries of the city district committees only one was Lithuanian, while there were 4 Russians, one Belarussian, and one of another nationality³. Among other, the so-called third secretaries, there was only one Russian, while the other six were Lithuanians⁴. In 1968, there were forty-four second secretaries in the committees for rural regions. Though the majority among them did not represent Slavonic nationality (there were 24 Lithuanians, 14 Russians, two Ukrainians and one Belarusian), however, the national 'specifics of the seconds' is seen by comparing this composition with the composition of other secretaries of regional committees. There were thirty-seven Lithuanians among the forty-four first secretaries of regional committees, and even thirty-nine Lithuanians among the third secretaries⁵. Quite a large number of Russian speaking persons remained in the posts of second secretaries at the party committees of towns and regions until the end of the Soviet era. In 1987, Russians among them accounted for 17.6 per cent and Belarussians for 3.5 per cent. A considerably smaller percentage was among the first secretaries – only 5.3 per cent⁶.

The situation in Soviet Lithuania is comparable with neighbouring Latvia during the Khrushchev times. The number of Latvians in the position of second secretaries in party committees of cities reached only 20 per cent in 1951–1954, it declined in 1955 to 16,6 per cent and after that grew up to 33,3 per cent in 1956. More Latvians occupied positions of second secretary in district committees where their number rose from 30 per cent in 1949 to 51,7 per cent to 51,7 and after that declined to 48,2 per cent in 1956. Compared to the situation with first and third secretaries of cities and

² LCP CC statistical report on the staff composition by 1 Feb. 1968 // Lithuanian Special Archive, LSA. F. 1771. Ap. 248. B. 189. L. 3.

³ LCP CC statistical report on the staff composition by 1 Feb. 1968 // LSA. F. 1771. C. 248. F. 189. L. 11.

⁴ Ibid. L. 12.

⁵ Ibid. F. 1771. C. 248. F. 189. L. 16–18.

⁶ LCP CC statistical information signed by V. Beriozov 'National composition by 17 Jan. 1987' // LCP. F. 1771. C. 278. F. 94. L. 42, 43.

districts the number of Latvians among the second secretaries was the smallest one: among first secretaries in periphery districts Latvians constituted 56,7 per cent in 1949, their number reached 62,7 per cent in 1951 and after that declined to 51,7 per cent in 1956, nevertheless being higher than the rate of the second secretaries. The number of Latvians in the position of first secretaries in cities districts reached even 66,6 per cent in 1954 and in 1955, and 50 per cent in 1956⁷.

The link of the Second Secretary with the system of second persons is evident from the interview with Sergey Rybakov, the Second Secretary of the Utena regional party committee in Lithuania. It is interesting to note that he defines periods of events not by the ruling periods of the first secretary of Lithuania but by the working period of the Second. He would rather say 'under Dybenko' instead of saying 'under Sniečkus' or 'under Griškevičius'. Secondly, his narrative discloses his paternalistic link with the Second as of a client. According to the recollections of Rybakov, upon his arrival in Vilnius from the region he visited Dybenko first. So, Rybakov estimates the Second as the authoritative leader⁸.

Thus, we may assume that the system of second persons served Moscow as the alternative to the titular nomenklatura informational and supervisory channel, which ensured the control over the actions of local functionaries.

The question could rise about chronological boundaries of the institution of the second secretaries. We can see clear emergence, or say, reinstallation of this institution in the middle of the 50s when the representatives of the centre were sent into Caucasus republics as well as Baltic republics. Of course, deep roots of the institution are going back to early Stalin era, and even – if we will follow an empire approach – we can see genesis in governor institution of Tsarist Russia. For example, during one interview in Tbilisi a respondent suggested to pay attention to activity of Tsarist governors. So, it is possible to trace a certain heritage to the old Russian Empire as some kind of imperial mode of periphery control revamped ideologically under the Soviets. Nevertheless, the roots and a genesis of the institution are not the same phenomena as the institution itself and we will keep a chronological distance from Tsarist Russia here.

The emergence of the institution of Second secretary was interrupted after Stalin's death. Beria raised "Question of Lithuanian SSR" in 1953 enabling Lithuanian nomenklatura to send back to Moscow Russian second secretary Aronov and appoint native Lithuanian Kazimieras Liaudis into this position⁹. Nevertheless, it was only a short 3 year time period when Lithuanians – above mentioned Liaudis and after – Motiejus Šumauskas were in the position. The institution was reinstalled by Khrushchev's political cycle already in the beginning of 1956. Appointment of Boris Sharkov as the second secretary in Lithuania¹⁰ marked a new stage in Soviet Centre – republic relations which lasted till the late 80's when Lithuanian Russian Vladimir Beriozov not being Moscow functionary was promoted into position in 1989. Soviet Lithuania was not the only republic where occupation of the position of the second secretary by Russian functionaries who had previous work experience in Moscow took place

⁷ Table of quantity of party secretaries – Latvians from 1949 till 1956 // Latvian State Archive. F. 101. C. 30. F. 94. L. 25.

⁸ S. Grybkauskas interview with Sergey Rybakov on 12 November 2009.

⁹ The stenograph of Plenum V of Central Committee of Lithuanian Communist Party in 1953 06 11–13 // LSA. F. 1771. C. 131. F. 182.

¹⁰ The stenograph of the IX congress of Lithuanian Communist Party in 1956 01 24–27 // LSA. F. 1771. C. 171. F. 7.

in the middle of sixties. Neighboring Latvia and Caucasus republics Azerbaijan and Georgia received new functionaries in the place too. The main feature of the reinstated institute of the second secretary was their personal biographies and direct relations with the department of Organizational party work of CC of CPSU. We can name the second secretaries as "birds of a feather". It means that before appointment to the position of the second secretary in a Soviet republic a functionary worked in the department for Organizational party work of CPSU in Moscow in order to get more experience and knowledge what Moscow really needs from the republics as well as to establish personal social relations with centre functionaries. Although this department consisted of many if not of all Soviet republics representatives, as the rule only Slavic people could reach higher position in the department – as inspector, head of department's sector or even deputy head of the department. Representatives of other nationalities worked as instructors of the department and after they were sent to their republics to a higher position of party secretary of CC of the republic or head of department. Above mentioned the position of the instructor was too low for reaching such a high position as the second secretary. So, it means, that only persons of Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian origin, who were in a higher position in the department, could expect to be promoted to the position of second secretary in the Soviet republic. Most of second secretaries in Soviet republics were birds of a feather: that was not the case in the past.

It is interesting that re-establishing of the institution in the Baltic republics was not directly related to the national question, yet formally brought to life by agricultural problems, at least – the argumentation of need of Moscow representative was based on agricultural arguments. The poor agricultural performance in Baltic republics gave Moscow an opportunity to criticize Baltic republics nomenklatura.

The beginning of the reinstallation of the institution could be seen in the Kruschchev visit to Riga and Tallin. After Kruschchev visited Tallin in 1955 and after Baltic agriculture meeting in Riga, the Baltic republic nomenklatura were described in Moscow party apparatus as loyal to Moscow yet politically weak and lacking knowledge how to meet and respond to challenges in agriculture correctly. The republics leaders' reference to bad weather conditions in 1955 was not sufficient for Moscow. Moscow preferred to see mistakes and lack of party work in the villages and kolhoses.

So we can see kind of the Soviet universalism of agriculture policy – the rapid collectivization in Baltic republics during the Stalin era enabled Kremlin to deeply invade the sphere of republics' issues, even if these republics were ascribed as having long agricultural tradition and high production culture before collectivization. Actually, the economic performance in 1955 was poor. It is interesting that at the XX party congress in 1956 Kruschchev noted that all union agricultural development succeeded after short slow down in the beginning of 50's and only Baltic republics and part of Belarus had development problems.

Kruschchev and his cycle's attitude to Baltic agriculture problems led party apparatus to organize big control campaigns in which brigades of Moscow functionaries visited and even stayed in the republics for a long time. As result of this checking and the so-called help campaign on December 1, 1955 a CPSU resolution on agriculture problems in Baltic republics was issued.

Republics leaderships were pushed to accept criticism coming from Moscow and even ask Moscow for help in strengthening of cadres who were responsible for agriculture matters. For example, as the head of Organizational party work department

Egor Gromov and the head of agriculture department Krestjanikov pointed out in their letter to Central Committee, the first secretary of Latvia Kalnberzin agreed with Moscow proposition regarding mistakes in agriculture policy and himself asked Moscow to send to Latvia party workers who were capable of supervising agriculture matters. E. Gromov and Krestjanikov suggested to their authority to send a new party second secretary and deputy chair of Council of ministries from Moscow¹¹. In 1956 the former deputy head of the department Kašnikov was sent to Riga as the second secretary. Although he surprisingly failed an election into CC members of LCP in 1958 during national communist affair, the institution of the second secretary was renewed after party purges in Latvia in 1959: after dismissal of Vilis Krumins from the position Moscow sent Gribkov to fill the position.

In a very similar way appointment of the second secretaries from Moscow had taken place in other Baltic republics. The first party secretary of Estonia Kebin in his letter of 25 November of 1955 asked Moscow to recall deputy chair of Council of Ministries Sokolov who was responsible for agriculture and send to republic new one as well as a new person to the position of secretary of CC of Estonia, who had to supervise agriculture policy in the republic¹².

The secretary of Soviet Lithuania Antanas Sniečkus addressed Moscow in 1955 requesting to send a new head of agriculture department of CC of Lithuanian Communist party. It could be seen as a tactical step of Sniečkus here in which he aimed to get a lower level functionary from Moscow instead the second secretary. Nevertheless, his plan was unsuccessful. In December of 1955 Sniečkus and the second secretary Motiejus Šumauskas were invited to the meeting of secretariat CPSU where decisions about changes in republic's leadership were made. It is quite interesting that among the CPSU apparatus functionaries invited to the meeting of the Secretariat there were only representatives of Organizational party work (deputy head of department Pigalev and head of department's sector Gavrilov), the administrative bodies, science and Propaganda (Konstantinov) departments and no one from agriculture department¹³. Following the Organizational party work suggestion the secretariat of CPSU took decision to remove Mečislovas Gedvilas from position of Chair of Council of Ministries. The above mentioned second secretary Šumauskas filled in this position. In January, during the Soviet Lithuanian party IX congress the former inspector of CC of CPSU Boris Šarkov was appointed in to the position of the second secretary of Central Committee of Lithuanian Communist party. Sniečkus speeches and behavior during this congress were very controversial and they invited critique from Central Committee of CPSU representatives who participated in the congress and followed the proceeding. Republic leader spoke vaguely about the need of a second secretary to be sent from Moscow.

So, generally speaking, these changes encompassed Sniečkus and Gedvilas competition which had echoed earlier political fight between Khrushchev and Malenkov. Agricultural context and political duel between Sniečkus and Gedvilas let Moscow intervene more deeply in the republic nomenklatura matters and re-establish the political institution of the second secretary in Soviet Lithuania.

Behind the agriculture problems there stood real Moscow intentions to maintain stronger control over Baltic republics, partly because of some nationalistic expressions

¹¹ РГАНИ. Ф. 5. Оп. 31. Д. 26. Л. 40.

¹² Kebin letter to CC of CPSU 1955 11 25 // РГАНИ. Ф. 5. Оп. 31. Д. 26. Л. 86.

¹³ РГАНИ. Ф. 5. Оп. 31. Д. 59. Л. 116.

in the region. Moscow saw the kind of nationalism expression already in the middle of 50's even before Hungarian and Polish events in 1956. It is interesting that according to Moscow some nationalistic attitude came from Estonia. During one meeting of Presidium of CPSU in 1959 Kalnberzinš argued that after returning back from one Estonian plenum in 1954 the that day second secretary Vilis Kruminš spoke extensively about Estonians' attitude against Russians, about needs to promote Latvian cadres.

Nevertheless, the position of the second secretary in Estonia was occupied by a Russian speaking Estonian for quite a long time. According to Rein Taagepera, Moscow really trusted this group of functionaries. Only in 1970 Konstantin Lebedev, who previously was the head of Belarus and Baltic sector of Organizational party work department of CC of CPSU, was sent in to this position. Being head of this sector, Lebedev was familiar not only with all Baltic republics context but with nationalism issues as well. In the late of 50's he worked in CC of CPSU apparatus as instructor of Caucasus sector where he was responsible for Azerbaijan – display of nationalism and first signs of Karabach problem emerged during this time.

It is seen in the documents of central committee of CPSU that the second secretaries in Baltic republics were encouraged by the department not to limit their activities only by agriculture issues. The second secretaries were often criticized for lacking strong and hard position towards local nomenklatura activities, shortcomings in ideology sphere and cadre policy. So, beginning from very agricultural matters the institution of second secretary acquired the shape of Moscow representatives.

The Institution of the second secretary in action: behavior strategies of the second secretaries

We can trace here three strategies of behavior for second secretaries delegated from Moscow to Soviet republics: 1) to be the agent of the Centre, fulfilling the tasks of Moscow in a Soviet republic, 2) balance between the tasks of the Centre and the interests of the republic nomenklatura, or 3) become a localized functionary, actually assisting in the realization of interests of the local nomenklatura.

The second behavior strategy was the most useful both for Moscow as it served its interests and for the local titular nomenklatura. This one reflected the essence of Soviet corporate state where activity of the Second secretary played an important role in balancing of interests. The question is: why not strategy number one? One could argue that only fulfillment of tasks set by the Moscow was useful for the Regime. In this case the Second secretary needed as much Moscow repressions against the local nomenklatura as possible in order to create his own personal networks: exchange safety for nomenklatura members in loyalty and belonging to clients of the Second. It is right if we speak about the Stalin period. As Oleg Khlevniuk pointed out, it is possible to speak about local nomenklatura stratum even at the beginning of the 50's. Brezhnev policy "trust in cadres" was not a new drive by Brezhnev political cycle, it was kind of recognition of political reality¹⁴.

Further, even intensive and routine cadre cleaning in Soviet periphery during Stalin time did not secure Moscow control over Soviet republics: local nomenklatura and its horizontal networks grew up immediately after cadre cleaning. So, high level

¹⁴ *Хлевнюк О. В. Региональная Власть В СССР в 1953 – конце 1950-х гг. Устойчивость и конфликты // Отечественная история. 2007. № 3. С. 48.*

of repressions was not the right path of maintaining a sustainable control. So, the first behaviour strategy of the second (fulfilling the tasks of Moscow in a Soviet republic only) was hardly possible due to lack of Kremlin repressions and strong positions of local nomenklatura.

Only the second strategy of behavior made it possible for the Second secretary to use his personal advantage, experience and enabled him to lead in getting across Moscow political decision to the republic party organization. The position of the main interpreter of Moscow decisions in Soviet republic led him to capture an important place, high nomenklatura status and helped Second secretary to create his own personal networks. So, following this strategy the Second secretary had possibility to use his soft power and expand his status, influence and networks – for himself personally, and secondly – to contribute to deeper penetration into republic's matter and Moscow decisions retranslation into the republic.

Soft power is the ability to obtain one's goals through attraction rather than coercion. Soft power means personal and cultural attraction in seeking positive outcomes. One question could rise: was the Soviet ideology and culture attractive to Baltic people? The concept of soft power coined by Joseph Nye is directly related to the subject of international relations, with problem of US power expansion which includes using of states culture for US domination in the World. There are authors who very similarly describe Soviet ethnic policy in 20s and 30s: either as soft power concretely, or in very similar terms, as for example, Terry Martin's Affirmative Action Empire. But situation in Baltic republics could be different in comparison with Middle Asian republics due to cultural circumstances and higher economic performance.

Secondly, speaking about the Second secretaries, it should be mentioned that they had bad name in Baltic memories and in other Soviet republics as well.

The historical memory has created an image of the Second as the head of the cabinet, a scholastic and intellectually limited functionary. Thus, V. Kharazov, the Second Secretary, who worked in Lithuania from 1967 until 1978, is described in gloomy colours, as an individual comprehending neither local conditions nor cultural environment. He is depicted by former employees of the apparatus as an intriguer collecting complaints and discrediting evidence about other leaders. The Lithuanian nomenklatura was displeased with his interference into the matters of other party leaders: economic issues, the sphere of culture and in particular ideology were the scope of his interests. Precisely at the initiative of Kharazov a luxurious wedding palace was built in Vilnius with the view of distracting young couples from having church marriages. In the Chronicles of the Catholic Church of the 1970s, published by samizdat, he was called the Soviet 'Muravjov the Hanger' – as a parallel to the blackly famous tsarist General Governor of Vilnius (1863–1865) M. Muravjov, who drowned in blood the Lithuanian-Polish uprising of 1863–1864. In the 1970s, Kharazov suggested that the eighteenth century St. Jacob's baroque church should be pulled down and a party palace built on the site. Encouraging the construction of secularized objects witnessing Soviet progress, Kharazov attempted at the same time to impede the organisation of national events or reconstruction of historical objects. Kharazov criticised the Song and Dance Festival, which is nowadays the acknowledged UNESCO cultural heritage, criticised the restoration of Vilnius Castle. Former cultural workers still remember his poor literary taste based only on Soviet internationalism.

When the members of the Central Committee of the LCP were elected at the 16th congress of the LCP in 1971 Kharazov collected the most votes "against" – as many as 50 delegates voted against him. Kharazov's case is not the only example of

unpopularity of the Seconds. Spread of the national communism in Latvia in the late 50's began the very moment the Second secretary Filipp Lashnikov failed elections to become the member of the Central Committee.

There are many examples from other Soviet republics where the second secretaries mislead people and failed in their duties. Estonian komsomol organization requested that the Russian second secretary should be sent out from the republic in 1968. The Second Secretary of Georgia Churkin was persecuted by new republic leader Eduard Shevardnadze in the middle of 70's and was jailed for corruption. The second secretary of Uzbekistan Osetrov was charged with the same and jailed. These facts show critical attitude against many of these Moscow representatives. So, how is it possible to speak about personal attraction and leadership of these functionaries?

First of all, prevailing outlook in the nowadays societies on second secretaries and several factual examples of misbehavior are not completely sufficient for the general assessment of latter's activities. Biographies of the Seconds refer to their excellent education, substantial working experience not only within the Moscow CC apparatus, where, as a rule, before the appointment as a Second, they used to work as instructors for Organizational party work, and later as inspectors or even heads of sector. Before starting their activities in Moscow, they worked as party secretaries at various party organizations in Russia or other Soviet republics, sometimes in more than one. Valery Kharazov, for example, graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute, which, as stated by Dobrynin, the former Soviet Ambassador to the US, was among the most prestigious higher educational establishments, with its alumni working not only in the sphere of aviation, but also largely appointed to diplomatic activities¹⁵. Before starting his party career in Moscow Kharazov worked in Kazakhstan as a secretary of the city party committee in Almaty. He started his work for the Moscow CC apparatus in 1961 and it did not keep him in his office all the time. As an instructor, Kharazov was supervising Belarus and, according to him, spending quite a lot of time there. The subsequent occupational activities of the inspector included the leadership of commissions and checking the activities in various republics. According to him, Moldova was the only republic he did not visit during the period of his work as an inspector. Quick understanding of the matter and dispute or conflict resolution was a significant feature of the Moscow CC inspector. It could be stated for a comparison that only a few, if any, CC secretaries of the party organizations in Soviet republics could equal the Second in terms of experience. Though a certain practice was observed that Moscow, before appointing a titular functionary to a top-level post, placed him for a few years in the same Moscow CC department of organizational party work, however, it was usually the responsibility of the instructor supervising the activities of one republic. Apparently, it is with good reason that such functionaries depending on their character features and the experience acquired in the position of the Second Secretary were often offered diplomatic activities.

In 1978 Kharazov was replaced by N. Dybenko, who, after his career in Lithuania, worked as the Ambassador in Mozambique from 1986 to 1991. He was the only Soviet ambassador in the region during Gorbachev time holding high party post – member of Central Committee of CPSU¹⁶.

¹⁵ Добрынин А. Ф. Сугубо доверительно. Посол в Вашингтоне при шести президентах США (1962–1986 гг.). С. 17.

¹⁶ Vanneman P. Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa – Gorbachev's Pragmatic Approach. Hoover Press Publications, 1990. P. 5.

Thus, second secretaries by their education and personal experience were not inferior to the top-ranking titular nomenklatura representatives; quite the contrary. Differently from the head of the titular nomenklatura, who enjoyed favorable 'inceptive' conditions at the beginning of activities, he could rely not only on his powers, but also on personal contacts, relations with family members, friends and countrymen, the most significant role within the network of the Second Secretary being actually played by institutional resources. Referring to them, he could use his powers for establishing personal networks, from which, as a representative of Moscow, he could get feedback.

Despite very critical attitude of local functionaries towards the Seconds these ones had quite moderate personal attraction and leaders' features, especially taking into account difficult conditions of their work as Moscow representatives. The Second secretaries might be very useful for local nomenklatura because of their skills and knowledge. Being Moscow representative could mean not only officious Centre control under local nomenklatura but intermediation between two or several nomenklatura groups as well, especially in Multi-ethnic republics, for example in Caucasus republics. For example, Kolbin, who was the second secretary in Georgia from 1975 till 1985 had a very good reputation among past Georgian nomenklatura members. Kolbin headed party commission on regulation of relationship between Georgia and autonomy Abkhazia¹⁷.

As was mentioned above, the Second secretary had spent several years in Moscow, where he worked as inspector, head of division or even, as in the case of Nikolaj Belukha, deputy head of department. They had acquired good sense and feeling how Moscow decisions were made. So, they were quite intuitive about the implications of Kremlin taken decisions and how the republic party had to respond to a particular decision. Only at a superficial glance Soviet decisions looked very boring and all being made according to the same pattern. Rather, the archival documents show that Soviet republic leaders were often challenged when trying to find the correct way of responding Moscow decisions. We could see that in these cases experience of Second secretary played important role. For example, Belukha in Latvia CC Bureau was the main speaker on these issues. Secondly, Belukha was the main editor of all speeches and reports for party conferences and plenums. On the other hand, Moscow was deeply interested that all Kremlin decisions were interpreted in periphery appropriately. The Moscow ideological discourse covered an activity of the Second, but he was not limited to it. This discourse and direct relations (line) with Moscow gave him hard power and expanded his status among titular nomenklatura members. But as interpreter he was quite autonomous – his interpretation meant a better Moscow decision retranslation into territory of the Soviet republic. By doing this, he used to use soft power – his knowledge and experience. As could be seen from documents of Central Committee of CPSU, the Central apparatus was drowned up to their eyes in documents from periphery. So, establishment of the institution of the second secretaries was a very rational way for Moscow to control all republics which saved enormous costs of bureaucratic correspondence.

On the other hand, the second secretaries were used by local nomenklatura as a kind of shield against Moscow critics. They could argue that things are going wrong because of the second secretary's failure and would then request for a new second secretary to be sent from Moscow. Additionally, the Second secretaries might be very

¹⁷ S. Grybkauskas interview with Eduard Shevardnadze on 1 September 2011 // Archive of interior Ministry of Georgia Republic.

useful for local nomenklatura because of their skills and knowledge. As it was already mentioned, the Second secretary had spent several years in Moscow, where he worked as inspector, head of division or even, as in case of Nikolai Belukha in Latvia, deputy head of the department. They had good sense and feeling how Moscow decisions were arrived at and made. Only at a superficial glance Soviet decisions looked very boring and all being made according to the same pattern. Rather, the archival documents show that Soviet republic leaders were often challenged when trying to find the correct way of responding to Moscow decisions. We could see that in these cases experience of Second secretary played important role. For example, Belukha in Latvia CC Bureau was the main speaker on these issues. Secondly, Belukha was the main editor of all speeches and reports for party conferences and plenums. On the other hand, Moscow was deeply interested that all Kremlin decisions were interpreted in periphery appropriately. The Moscow ideological discourse covered an activity of the Second, but he was not limited to it. This discourse and direct relations (line) with Moscow gave him hard power and expanded his status among titular nomenklatura members. But as interpreter he was quite autonomous – his interpretation meant a better Moscow decision retranslation into the territory of the Soviet republic. By doing this, he used to use soft power – his knowledge and experience.

Conclusions

1. The institution of the second secretary in Soviet republics was re-established in the middle of the 50's having formal aim of improving control over agricultural matters, yet the real Moscow intension was to strengthen its control over titular nomenklatura.
2. The second secretaries as functionaries had big party work experience, particularly in Central Committee in CPSU, which enabled Moscow to use them for deeper penetration into republic matters.
3. In their activities the second secretaries used not only formal status of an influential party functionary, but also the components of soft power – their knowledge and experience got from the past work in Moscow.